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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(ii)(West 2008)
provides for jurisdiction for the Utah Supreme Court to
review final orders of the Utah State Tax Commission.

As to

the sole issue decided by the Commission on the Petitioners'
Motions for Summary Judgment, retroactivity of this Court's
decision, the Commission's order is final.

Petitioner has

stipulated that if the Order is sustained on Appeal, "There
are no other issues remaining" and "that the request for
refunds in this matter shall have been fully resolved with
no right to further appeal."1
In Barker v. Utah Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d
702, 706-07 (1998), the Court concluded that, unlike appeals
from the district court, an agency appeal may be considered
final as to a discrete issue even if other issues remain
unresolved.

Here, the Commission acknowledges that as to

the discrete issue of retroactive application of the Court's
decision, its decision is final.
The Commission acknowledges, and the parties have
stipulated that, if the decision is not sustained on that
basis, the matter would require remand to the Commission to

1

Stipulation attached in Appendix as Exhibit A.
1

determine the proper method of valuation and the value of
Petitioners' oil and gas for severance tax purposes as

set

forth in the statute.
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jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over;...
(e)

final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceeding originating with:...

(ii) the State Tax Commission;....
The Court's reading of Section III of its prior
decision in ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53, 1 24, would be
determinative of the sole issue presented in this appeal.
This section is set forth in the appendix as Exhibit B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioners, Exxon Corporation, (Exxon) Mobil
Exploration and Production North America, (MEPNA) and
ExxonMobil Corporation, (ExxonMobil) appeal from the denial
of Motions for Summary Judgment filed in four separate
appeals before the Utah State Tax Commission, 06-0915 Exxon
Corporation 1998, 06-1218 ExxonMobil Corporation 1999, 071118 Mobil Exploration and Production 2000, 07-1124
ExxonMobil Corporation 2000-2003.
Course of Proceedings
Exxon Corporation filed an amended 1998 severance tax
return on May 19, 2005.

The amended return claimed an

3

overpayment of $71,105.00.3 (06-0915 R.10.)

On May 31,

2006, the Auditing Division issued a statutory notice
reducing the requested refund to $4,314.13 for the following
reasons:
a.

Gathering costs are not allowable deductions;

b.

Oil stripper value was overstated because four
wells claimed by Exxon did not qualify/ and

c.

Taxable value is not properly allocated between
the three and five percent rates.

Id. On June 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a Request for Agency
Action and Petition for Redetermination (06-0915 R.l.)
Exxon Corporation filed an amended 1999 annual
severance tax return on May 24, 2006.

The amended return

indicated an overpayment of $94,303.00. (06-1218 R.202.)

On

August 30, 2006, the Auditing Division issued a statutory
notice which reduced the refund request to $15,577.00.

The

Auditing Division disallowed claims for "gathering costs,"
which are not an allowable transportation deduction. (061218 R.199-202.) On September 28, 2006, ExxonMobil
Corporation filed a Request for Agency Action and Petition
3

As this case involves four separate appeals with four
separately numbered records, citations to the record will
distinguish the appeal number and page number of the record

for Redetermination. (06-1218 R.193.)
Mobil Exploration and Production (MEPNA) filed an
amended 2000 annual severance tax return. The amended return
claimed an overpayment of $261,444.00.

On August 24, 2007,

the Auditing Division issued a statutory notice denying the
refund request. (07-1118 R.183-186.)

On September 7, 2007,

MEPNA filed a Request for Agency Action and Petition for
Redetermination. (07-1118 R.177.) Exxon Corporation filed
amended tax returns for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.

The

amended returns indicated overpayments of $84,64 9.00 for tax
year 2000, $389,689.00 for tax year 2001, $400,156.00 for
tax year 2002, and $372,569.00 for tax year 2003. (07-1124
R.188.) On August 22, 2007, the Auditing Division issued a
statutory notice denying these refund requests in their
entirety. (07-1124 R.185-188.) On September 7, 2007,
ExxonMobil Corporation filed a Request for Agency Action and
Petition for Redetermination. (07-1124 R.177.)
On February 26, 2008, Petitioners filed Motions for
Summary Judgment in each of the four appeals. (06-0915 R.67,
06-1218 R.164, 07-1118 R.163, 07-1124 R.162.)

Although the

cases were never consolidated, because the grounds for
Petitioners7 motions were identical in each case, a single
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hearing on the motions was held on June 17, 2008. (06-0915
R.510.)

On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its

order denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment.
(06-0915 R.509.)

On December 11, 2008, Petitioners filed a

Petition for Review. (06-0915 R.533.)
Disposition of Administrative Proceedings
On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its order
denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment in appeal
numbers 06-0915, 06-1218, 07-1118, and 07-1124. (07-1118
R.5.)

In reviewing motions for summary judgment all facts

and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Wayment v. Clear Channel BroaHr^tina.

Tnr

20Q5

UT 2

^

n 6

P.3d 271.
The Commission, in ruling on the sole issue before it
in the Motions for Summary Judgment, found that the
selective prospective effect of the Court's prior decision
was limited to the claim for refund in that proceeding.
Commission concluded:
Therefore, there is no reason for the Commission
to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil
Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was entitled to
"further adjudication of its claim for a refund"
it meant something other than the specific refund
claim that was before it in the matter.

The

(06-0915 R.520.) The Commission therefore ruled that the
various Petitioners (Exxon, ExxonMobil, and MEPNA) were not
entitled to retroactive application of the Court's decision
in the prior ExxonMobil case. Icl. The Motions for Summary
Judgment were denied. (06-0915 R.515-520.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

ExxonMobil is the result of a merger between Mobil

Corporation, and a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon
Corporation, which occurred on or about November 30, 1999.
(06-0915 R.511.)
2.

During the 1990Ts MEPNA owned and operated oil and

gas producing wells within the Greater Aneth Field in
southern Utah.

Those wells were located in the McElmo Creek

Unit and the Ratherford Unit. (Id.)
3.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 39.956

percent of the production from the McElmo Creek Unit.

Exxon

Corporation owned 24.787 percent and the remainder of the
production was owned by Texaco and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. (Id. )
4.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 64.367

percent of the production from the Ratherford Unit.

Exxon

Corporation did not own any production from that field.
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The

remaining production was owned by Texaco, Chieftain, and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
5.

(Id.)

From 1993 through 1998 MEPNA filed returns and

paid severance taxes on its production of oil and gas from
the Greater Aneth field by calculating the value of the oil
based on its contract price.

(06-0915 R.512.) Amended

returns were filed for the 1993 through 1998 tax years for
MEPNA's production during those periods.
6.

(id. )

The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax

Division denied ExxonMobil's request for refunds regarding
the returns originally filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through
1998 tax years, (id.) The Commission upheld the Division's
denial of the refund request. (Id. )
7.

ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision to

the Utah Supreme Court. (Id.)
8.

The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on

November 21, 2003 in ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State T^v
Comm'n, 2003 UT 53,87 P.3d 706, remanding the matter back to
the Tax Commission. (Id.)
9.

On remand, the Commission directed the Division to

issue a severance tax refund to ExxonMobil.
R.513. )

8

(06-0915

10.

On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed a 1998

severance tax return claiming ExxonMobil Corporation had
made an overpayment of $71,105.00. (Id. )
11.

By Statutory Notice dated May 1, 2006 the Auditing

Division denied most of the 1998 refund request relating to
the tax paid by Exxon Corporation.

ExxonMobil appealed the

denial to the Utah State Tax Commission and the appeal was
designated as Appeal Number 06-0915, the first of the Tax
Commission Appeals in this matter. (Id.)
12.

On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an

amended 1999 severance tax return that claimed Exxon
Corporation had made an overpayment of $94,303.00.

By

Statutory Notice dated August 30, 2006, the Division
informed ExxonMobil that the severance tax would be reduced
by only $15,500.77.

ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the

remainder of the refund to the Utah State Tax Commission.
The appeal is designated as Appeal Number 06-1218.
13.

On or about February 28, 2007, MEPNA filed an

amended 2000 severance tax return, which indicated an
overpayment of $261,444.00.

By Statutory Notice dated

August 24, 2007, the Division informed MEPNA that it denied
the severance tax refund.

MEPNA filed an appeal which is

9

identified as Appeal Number 07-1118. (06-0915 R.514.)
14.

On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed

amended severance tax return for the 2000 tax year, which
claimed an overpayment of $84,649.00.

By Statutory Notice

dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed ExxonMobil that
it denied its severance tax refund request for the 2000 tax
year.

ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial to the Utah

State Tax Commission.

The appeal is identified as number

07-1124. (06-0915 R.514-515.)
15.

On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed

amended severance tax returns for the 2001, 2002, and 2003
tax years, which indicated overpayments of $359,689.00 for
2001, $400,155.83 for 2002, and $372,568.62 for 2003.

By

Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007 the Division informed
ExxonMobil it had denied its severance tax refund.
ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial.

The appeal is

identified as number 07-1124. (06-0915 R.515.)
16.

On February 26, 2008 Petitioners filed Motions for

Summary Judgment claiming that the prior ExxonMobil decision
should be retroactively applied to their refund requests.
(06-0915 R.71.)
17. A hearing on the motions was held June 17, 2008.
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(06-0915 R.510.)
18.

On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its

order denying Petitioners' Motions for Summary Judgment.
(06-0915 R.509.)
19.

Petitioners filed this Petition for Review on

December 10, 2008.

(06-0915 R.513.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In ExxonMobil v. State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d
706, this Court clearly established the limited exception to
the prospective application of its ruling and clearly stated
the reasons for its holding:
We give our holding this selectively prospective
application because we are convinced that
retroactive application could result in large
refunds of taxes already collected and spent by
governmental entities. Although the full breadth
and depth of the impact is not immediately
apparent from the record before us, no doubt it
would be substantial and involve funds already
budgeted, collected, and spent. Large refunds of
money already collected and spent would pose a
great burden on the amici revitalization funds and
other relatively small governmental entities
operating on correspondingly small budgets. Thus,
whether in refund requests or deficiency
proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule
announced today is to have prospective application
only.
Id. at 1 23. The Court then reiterated in more concise
fashion:

11

Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further
adjudication for claim for a refund, as to other
parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the
Tax Commission, our holding is to apply
prospectively only.
Id. at ! 24 . The Tax Commission, in its decision, relied on
this reasoning and language, stating:
Therefore, there is no reason for the Commission
to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil
Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was entitled to
"further adjudication of its claim for refund" it
meant something other than the specific refund
claim that was before it in the matter.
(06-0915 R.520).

The Court's reasoning and its statements

regarding selective prospectivity in ExxonMobil are
consistent with the Court's prior application of that
doctrine in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681P.2d
184(Utah 1984) and Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
862P.2d 1348(Utah 1993).

Therefore, the Commission properly

held that in the separate appeals in this matter involving
tax years preceding 2004 the Court's interpretation of when
"production was complete" in ExxonMobil would not apply.
The doctrine of selective prospectivity was adopted by
this Court.

In applying that doctrine, the Utah Supreme

Court is not bound by other courts' interpretations
regarding rhe retroactive application of United States

12

Supreme Court precedent.

The Utah Supreme Court applied the

doctrine of selective prospectivity consistent with its own
precedent.
The application of the doctrine of selective
prospectivity in the prior case was not "clearly erroneous."
The ruling has had the desired effect and should not be
overturned in this appeal. The issues raised at the time
were valid and were thoroughly argued and briefed before the
Court, both on appeal and on reconsideration.

The Court

should not retreat from its prior holding.
Petitioners would not be entitled to summary judgment
in any of the four cases presented even if the Court's
interpretation of when "production is completed" in
ExxonMobil were to be applied in these appeals. Petitioners
have stipulated that the case would require remand for
valuation if the Court were to reverse the Commission's
decision. (See Appendix Exhibit A.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE LANGUAGE
OF THE COURT AND UTAH PRECEDENT BY RULING
SELECTIVE PROSPECTIVITY ONLY APPLIED TO THE CLAIMS
PRESENTED BEFORE THE EXXONMOBIL COURT.

The ExxonMobil decision only applies retroactively to
the claims Mobil Exploration and Producing ("MEPNA") brought
13

for the years 1993 to 1998 that were the subject of the
prior appeal.

This accords

the decision.

When the Utah Supreme Court has applied

with the specific language of

selective prospectivity the Court has limited the
retroactive effecr of its decisions to the claims presented
before the Court.
A.

Selective Prospectivity Only Applies to the
Claims Presented.

The Utah Supreme Court has used the doctrine of
selective prospectivity to limit the holding of a case to
the claims presented on appeal while applying its holding
prospectively to all other parties and claims.

See Rio

Alcorn Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah
1984) (holding retroactive applicability of a tax applied to
claims on which the "suit for refund was brought"); V-l Oil
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 915 (Utah 1996)
(holding that where a taxpayer sought a refund for all

taxes

unconstitutionally assessed, that retroactive application
applied

M

to the year in which" the plaintiffs alleged they

began to pay the surcharge) Overruled on other grounds, V-l
Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997);
Carter v. Beaver County Service Area, 16 Utah 2d 280, 283,
399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965) (holding a decision would be
14

retroactive to the "instant case/7 but prospective as to all
other cases) .
In Rio Algom, for instance, taxpayers sought a refund
for property taxes they paid under protest in 1981.
P.2d at 186.

681

The Utah Supreme Court held the property tax

assessments were unconstitutional and granted the taxpayers
relief for the year

in which the refund was sought, while

providing prospective application of the holding for
other claims. Id.

all

at 196.; see also Kennecott Corp. v. State

Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1993) (explaining the
plain language of Rio Alqom indicates the decision only
applied to parties to the case for 1981, the year in
question).
Further, in V-l, the plaintiff sought a refund for

all

monies that it claimed were unconstitutionally assessed as a
fuel surcharge. 942 P.2d at 909.

The Court initially

agreed4 that the fuel surcharge was unconstitutional and
held the decision applied retroactively to the claims of
unconstitutionality raised before the Court and
prospectively to all other claims. (Id. at 915.)
* On reconsideration the Court reversed and found the
Environmental Surcharge to be a fee, not a tax and therefore
constitutional. V-l Oil v. State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906,
918 (Utah 1997) .
15

Similarly, the Court in ExxonMobil provided retroactive
application only for the refund claims MEPNA presented to
the Court.

The Court stated the Petitioner was entitled to

"further adjudication of its claim

for a refund," whereas

all other parties who potentially had "refund claims,
deficiency proceedings, or similar matters... our holding is
to apply prospectivity only." ExxonMobil Corp., 2003 UT 53,
1 24 (emphasis added.) MEPNA's claim for a refund in
ExxonMobil included tax years 1993 to 1998.

While it is

clear the Court intended retroactive application of its
decision on rehearing for the refund claim that was the
subject of the appeal, it is equally clear that as to other
"refund requests, audit deficiencies or similar matters" the
holding was to "apply prospectively only." Id.
This is consistent with the Court's previous
application of selective prospectivity in Carter, Rio Alqom,
Kennecott, and V-l.

In none of those cases did the Court

expand its doctrine of selective prospectivity beyond the
claims presented to the Court to create a privilege that
inured to a particular taxpayer outside of the context of
the claim before the Court.

The Commission correctly

applied the Court's ruling when it refused to expand the

16

selective application of the Court's holding to claims not
before the ExxonMobil Court.
The Commission's application also accords with the
judicial policy articulated by the Court, which was to limit
the potential fiscal impact on amici and governmental
entities.

See Exxon, 2003 UT 53, 1 23.

Expanding

retroactive application of the Court's decision beyond the
claims presented, to include unknown claims by different
parties for different years and of completely different and
expanded scope, would be in direct contradiction of the
Court's stated rationale of limiting the potential impact of
the decision.
B.

The Commission Did Not Have the Authority to
Expand the Remand Order of the Court.

When an appellate court remands an issue to the
Commission the Commission only has the power to follow the
order of remand and may not expand the order beyond the
scope identified by the appellate court.

See Collard v.

Naale Const. Inc., 2006 UT 72, f 14, 149 P.3d 348 (holding
"trial court's only option" on remand was to apply the
appellate court's mandate.)

The Commission on remand

applied the Court's holding to the claims of MEPNA for the
years in question, 1993 through 1998.
17

The current claims include claims by the former Exxon
Corporation for 1998,for ExxonMobil and MEPNA separately for
1999 and 2000 and for Exxon and MEPNA jointly for 2000
through 2003.

The entities involved, the scope of the

claims, the years at issue, and the amounts at issue are all
well beyond the scope of the claim that was before the Court
in ExxonMobil- When the Court stated "as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective
application only," there was no manifest intent to create a
favored entity, or to establish on an ongoing basis, that
any claim coming under the general corporate umbrella of a
huge corporate entity was to receive distinct treatment
under the law.

Such a holding may well be suspect under

equal protection analysis.

Those concerns do not arise when

the statement is viewed in the context in which it was made,
specifically with reference to Court's remand for "further
adjudication of its claim for a refund.''
There was no information in the prior record regarding
the potential scope of treating ExxonMobil as a favored
entity, or how many other potential subsidiaries, be they
first, second, or third tier, might exist under various
names and corporate organizations.

18

The Court was aware,

however, of the scope of the claim presented and, taken in
that context, rather than in isolation, the Court's
statement "as to all but ExxonMobil" is reasonably and
rationally related to "further adjudication" of its claim,
as presented in that appeal.
The Commission's interpretation of the Court's language
to that effect is not erroneous.

It is consistent with the

Court's prior application of the doctrine of selective
prospectivity and the Court's stated rationalization for its
application in the particular instance.

Therefore, the

Commission's decision on the sole issue presented on appeal
should be affirmed.
II.

THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF SELECTIVE PROSPECTIVITY
IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

The selective prospectivity applied in ExxonMobil
should not be overturned.

The decision is in harmony with

previous cases applying selective prospectivity, therefore
the ruling is not "clearly erroneous."
A.

The Court's Decision Accords with Prior Case
Law on Selective Prospectivity.

In Utah, state courts addressing issues of state law
may determine whether a decision applies retroactively or
prospectively, and federal precedent relating to retroactive
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or prospective application is not binding. In Kennecott v.
State Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Utah 1993), this
Court reviewed federal case law on retroactivity in the
context of the selectively prospective application of its
decision in Rio Algom. Quoting Justice Souter's decision ii
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 501 U.S. 592, 111
S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) the Court stated:
"[S]ince the guestion is whether the Court should
apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity
is properly seen in the first instance as a matter
of choice of law, a choice... between the
principle of forward operation and that of
relation backward." That choice, Justice Souter
continued, is a federal
one where the rule at
issue itself derives from federal
law,
constitutional or otherwise. It follows from that
analysis that when the rule involved is one of
state law, as is the case here, the decision of
prospectivity or retroactivity belongs to the
state.
Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1351. This places the statement made
by the Court in dicta in Andrews v. Morris. 677 P.2d 81, 91
(Utah 1983), in its proper context. In Andrews, a state
review of the death sentence of William Andrews and Pierre
Dale Selby, the Court was dealing with retroactivity in a
criminal context when the Court stated:
We therefore hold that, subject to the exceptions
stated below, a decision of this Court construing
the Fourth Amendment is to be applied
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet
final at the time the decision was rendered. By so
doing, however, we leave undisturbed our
20

precedents in other areas. First, our decision
today does not affect those cases that would be
clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity
precedents.
Id. at 91.

The Court went on to enumerate those areas of

Fourth Amendment law not affected by its decision and stated
"finally, all questions of civil retroactivity continue to
be governed by the standard enumerated in Chevron Oil
Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97." (citations and footnotes
omitted.) While the statement in Andrews appears sweeping on
its face, the application of the statement in Andrews is
limited by the Court's later statement in Kennecott.
Chevron may be applicable in the analysis of the
retroactivity of federal rules in civil matters, but as to
the application of state law, it is not binding. It is
telling that Chevron was not cited or analyzed by the Court
in any of the cases decided subsequent to Andrews applying
the doctrine of selective prospectivity in state cases.
E.g., Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1351; see also Rio Alqom, 681
P.2d at 195 (noting purely prospective application of a
decision overruling prior authority does not violate the
U.S. Constitution). In Loyal Order v. County Board of
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (1982), The Court stated,
"Constitutional law neither requires nor prohibits
21

retroactive operation of an overruling decision."
As a .result, the Court's own judicial policy determines
whether to apply a decision retroactively or prospectively.
This applies with particular force in regard to the Court's
application of selective prospectivity in state tax cases.
See Kennecotjb, 862 P.2d at 1351.

Utah courts make this

decision by determining the extent of reliance on previous
state law and the burden that would be imposed by
retroactive application. Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d
1023, 1025-26 (Utah 1991).

While prospective application is

often appropriate when laws are found to be
unconstitutional, the Court also weighs the burden on state
and local governments in matters of statutory interpretation
and may, at its discretion, apply it decisions prospectively
if retroactive application would impose an undue burden.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984); see also
Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1037
(Utah 1983) (holding purely prospective application was
appropriate where a county treasurer did not fulfill his
statutory duties and the county was liable for interest
under the correct interpretation of the statute and
retroactive application would burden taxpayers and the
22

county).
In Board of Education, the Court held that a county
treasurer was not following a statute requiring the
treasurer to pay certain tax revenues to school districts at
the end of each month. (Id.

1035.)

While the Court

determined the treasurer was liable for damages for monies
not paid on time, the Court applied its decision
prospectively because of the burden retroactive application
may have had on the county and its taxpayers.

Id.

at 1037.

This decision clearly establishes that prospective
application of a rule is not restricted to instances where
"new law" is established, but may be applied whenever an
interpretation of a rule or law has been relied on or
whenever retroactive application may impose an undue burden.
The Court in ExxonMobil determined the Commission
misinterpreted a severance tax definition.

The Court's

determination to have its interpretation of the definition
apply prospectively accords with Board of Education.

In

both cases the Court determined that applying the Court's
interpretation of the law retroactively may be overly
burdensome on governmental entities, even though the Court
merely interpreted a statute and did not establish "new
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law."
Moreover, as Board of Education illustrates, the
judicial policy of the Court to apply a decision
prospectively only depends on burdens that may be disruptive
and does not require the Court to show that there will be an
actual burden.

659 P.2d at 1037. This issue was fully

briefed and argued by the parties and amici on both sides
and was the subject of a motion for rehearing in ExxonMobil.
To argue that the potential harm has not yet materialized
does not mean that the potential for harm was not adequately
demonstrated to the Court in ExxonMobil.
B.

The Court's Decision Is Not Clearly Erroneous.

In Utah, a party asking the Utah Supreme Court to
overturn prior precedent faces a "substantial burden of
persuasion."
1994.)

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah

The Court may only overrule a prior decision if it

is "clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to
render the prior decision inapplicable."

Munson v.

Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, 1 20, 173 P.3d 848.
In Menzies, the Court overruled precedent that had been
followed for twenty years because (1) the precedent
overruled nearly a century of case law without explanation,
24

(2) the precedent cited no authority and performed little
analysis to support its decision, and (3) the rule did "not
work very well."

Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400.

Further, in Munson, the Court justified its overruling
of a case because "the issue did not benefit from the focus
and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the
lower courts" and there was no "adversarial briefing of the
issue." Id. at ! 21.

The Court added that the overruled

portion of the opinion was "almost an afterthought," had a
"lack of analysis," and "simply [was] not supported by
statutory language."

Id. at I 20-21.

The ExxonMobil decision differs from both of these
cases in several major respects.

First, unlike the

precedent overruled in Menzies, the Court followed
established case law on the issue of selective prospectivity
and the Court supported its opinion with an analysis of the
judicial policies to be advanced by applying selective
prospectivity, namely, avoiding the burden to be placed on
the government and amici. Also, unlike Menzies, nothing in
the record indicates that the selective prospectivity
applied in this case is not functioning precisely as the
Court intended or that it is functioning other than how
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prior cases applying selective prospectivity have
functioned.
Second, unlike in Munson, in this case the parties, and
several amici presented adversarial briefs on the issue of
retroactivity and prospectivity at both the initial stage
and on rehearing.

Further, the Court clearly supported its

decision by citing to prior case law and by enunciating the
judicial policy it sought to achieve by applying selective
prospectivity.
The Petitioners' bare assertions-that amici and State
government would not be burdened if full retroactivity were
applied is belied by the number and dollar amounts of the
claims it brings in this appeal.

Petitioner's arguments are

insufficient to overcome the substantial burden of
persuasion required for this Court to overrule its prior
precedent.
The Court's ruling on selective prospectivity in
ExxonMobil is not "clearly erroneous." ExxonMobil's
application of selective prospectivity of the holding in
that case should be upheld.
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of Selective Prospectivity has
consistently been used to limit the financial impact of the
Court's decision to the cases and the parties before it.
This has the laudable impact of allowing governmental
entities to adapt to the Court's ruling by changing their
practices, adjusting their budgets, or addressing issues
through legislation on an ongoing basis without the prospect
of disrupting set budgets and settled expectations.
The Court's statements in ExxonMobil are entirely
consistent with its past application of the doctrines of
Selective Prospectivity.

The Commission properly took those

statements in the context they were made as well as in the
context of the Court's prior application of the doctrine
when it determined that the Court's holding in ExxonMobil
was to be given selective application only to those claims
that were before the Court in that matter. Therefore, as to
the single issue addressed by the Commission in the Motions
for Summary Judgment and the only issue presented in this
limited appeal, the Commission's determination was correct
and should be affirmed.
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David J. Crapo #5055
WOOD CRAPO LLC
60 E. South Temple. Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION and
MOBIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCINGPetitioners.
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
}
)
)
)

JOINT WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION
TO DISMISS AND WITHDRA WAL
OF MEMORAND UM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR
DAMA GES PURSUANT TO R ULE 33
Case No. 20081017

In an effort to resolve the dispute that has arisen from the motion to dismiss filed by the
Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission") and the opposition filed in response thereto byExxonMobil Corporation and Mobil Exploration and Producing ("Petitioners"'), the Parties
stipulate as follows:
1.

The Commission hereby withdraws its Motion to Dismiss.

2.

Petitioners hereby withdraw their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and its

Request for Damages under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3.

The Parties agree that the sole issue addressed by the Commission's order below

and on appeal to the Supreme Court is whether this Court's prior decision in ExxonMobil, 2003
UT53 should be applied retroactively to Petitioners' requests for severance tax refunds.
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H
Supreme Court of Utah.
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, and State of
Utah, Respondents.
No. 20021023.
Nov. 25, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 2004.
Background: Oil corporation petitioned for review
of decision of State Tax Commission denying corporation's request for refund of allegedly miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil and gas interests.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, \V ilk ins, J., held that:
(1) Commission miscalculated oil company's severance taxes by determining value of corporation's
taxable oil and gas interests at actual point of sale
rather than immediate vicinity of point at which oil
or gas was physically removed from earth, but
(2) holding had prospective effect only since retroactive application would have mandated large refunds of taxes already collected and spent by governmental entities.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
ill Mines and Minerals 260 <0^>87
260 Mines and Minerals
260111 Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
2601IK A) Statutory and Official Regulations
260k87 k. Licenses; Severance and Production Taxes. Most Cited Cases
Tax Commission miscalculated oil company's severance taxes by determining value of corporation's
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taxable oil and gas interests at actual point of sale
rather than immediate vicinity of point at which oil
or gas was physically removed from earth; Commission's method of calculation was based not only
on value of oil or gas actually removed from
ground and thus taken from state's pool of natural
resources, but on post-removal expenses as well,
such as transportation and refinement costs, and
statute governing severance taxes on oil and gas
seemingly contemplated valuation in immediate vicinity of point of removal from earth, assuming that
point was one at which sales actually occurred.
U.C.A.1953. 59-5-101, 59-5-103.
|2| Statutes 361 € ^ 1 8 8
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k 187 Meaning of Language
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited
Statutes 361 €^>206
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361\T(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire
Statute. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court interprets a statute by looking first
to its plain language, and, in doing so, it gives all
statutory provisions relevance and meaning independent of other provisions.
131 Statutes 361 € ^ 1 8 4
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361 kl 80 Intention of Legislature
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361k184 k. Policy and Purpose of Act.
Most Cited Cases
Statutes 361 €^>217.4
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
36IVl(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361 k217.4 k. Legislative History in
General. Most Cited Cases
Statutory ambiguities are resolved by looking to legislative history and other policy considerations for
guidance.
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*707 David J. Crapo, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Mark L. Shurtlcff, Att'y Gen., Clark L. Snelson,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Mark K. Buchi, Steven P. Young, Salt Lake City,
for amici ConocoPhillips Company, ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company.
Thomas W. Ciawson, Salt Lake City, for amicus
Union Oil Company of California.
Philip C. Pugslcy, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City,
for amici Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund, Navajo
Revitalization Fund.

[4| Statutes 361 €^>245
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(I3) Particular Classes of Statutes
361k245 k. Revenue Laws. Most Cited
Cases
In the context of a taxation statute, Supreme Court's
evaluation of ambiguous language requires it to
construe language liberally in favor of the taxpayer,
leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be
more restrictive if such intent exists.
|5] Mines and Minerals 260 €^>87
260 Mines and Minerals
260III Operation of Mines, Quarries, and Wells
260111(A) Statutory and Official Regulations
260k87 k. Licenses; Severance and Production Taxes. Most Cited Cases
Application of "prospective effect doctrine" was
appropriate with respect to Supreme Court's mandate requiring calculation of state severance taxes
on oil and gas interests to be based on value of oil
and gas at immediate vicinity of point at which oil
or gas was physically removed from earth, as retroactive application could have resulted in large refunds of taxes already collected and spent by governmental entities. U.CA.1953. 59-5-101, 59-5-103.

Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City,
for amicus Utah Division of Oil, Gas, & Mining.
Bill Thomas Peters, David W. Scoiield, Salt Lake
City, for amicus Utah Association of Counties.

WILKINS, Justice:
K 1 ExxonMobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil") filed
a petition for review of a Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") decision upholding the
denial of ExxonMobil's request for a refund of allegedly miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil
and gas interests. We reverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
U 2 The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. ExxonMobil requested a refund of severance
taxes it believes it overpaid from January 1, 1993
through December 31, 1998. During that period,
ExxonMobil operated numerous oil and gas wells
in southeastern Utah that were subject to the severance tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. section*
59-5-101 through-119 (2000).
H 3 ExxonMobil's operation of the wells involves
removing the oil and gas from the earth at the

© 2009 Tliomson Reuters/West.
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mouth of the well. At that point, the oil and gas is
in an emulsion form, mixed with impurities such as
water and sand. The impurities in the emulsion are
commonly known as basic sediment and water ("BS
& W"). At the point of removal *708 from the
earth, the entire emulsion is often referred to as
total production and is conveyed from the mouth of
the well, through a valve structure, and usually into
a separator tank or through pipelines for additional
refining. The emulsion "is almost never sold directly from the [valve structure]." Selling oil and gas
from the valve structure could be done, however, if
some sort of portable testing device were brought to
the site to measure volumes. Separator tanks are
generally located in the immediate vicinity of the
mouth of the well and allow the components of the
emulsion to separate so that much of the BS & W is
removed from the oil and gas. It appears from the
record that any gas is generally separated from the
rest of the emulsion at this point, while the oil and
the remainder of the emulsion are transported together. Sometimes oil and gas are sold at this point,
having been separated to some degree from the BS
& W and readied for transport to other facilities.
U 4 When the oil is not sold from a separator tank,
the remaining emulsion is transported to a satellite
facility that further treats the emulsion for sale.
Much like at a separator tank, sales also occur at
this point, but operators often elect instead to transfer the oil to a tank battery facility where it is further treated and then metered at a Lease Automatic
Custody Transfer ("LACT") meter and loaded onto
trucks or into pipelines. Though other entities do
so, during the time period in question ExxonMobil
rarely sold its oil directly from separator tanks in
the immediate vicinity of the well, instead transporting most of the oil to other facilities. When purchases were made in the well's vicinity, the purchase price was adjusted downward to account for
the remaining impurities and transportation costs,
among other things. In one transaction, the price
paid by the purchaser was reduced from a posted
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price of $12.79 per barrel to $9.29 per barrel.
H 5 The Tax Commission's general practice in calculating the severance tax due on oil has apparently
been to base the tax on the price of the oil at the actual point of sale. Thus, oil sold from the separator
tank, with its price adjusted downward, would be
taxed at a percentage of that lower price, whereas
oil sold from the battery facility would be taxed at
the same rate, but on a higher purchase price.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
If 6 The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission
("Auditing Division") denied ExxonMobil's request
for a refund of severance taxes ExxonMobil believed it had overpaid. ExxonMobil appealed that
decision to the Tax Commission, which bifurcated
the factual issues of what amount of tax was due
and paid from the legal issue of the appropriate
point for calculating the tax. The Tax Commission
held a formal hearing on the second issue.
1| 7 ExxonMobil argued that the statutory provisions
regarding the severance tax required the Auditing
Division to value the oil at the well site, which is
the point of removal from the earth. The Auditing
Division argued that valuation should occur at the
point of actual sale. The relevant statutory provisions require that the tax be computed based on
"the value, at the well, of the oil or gas," which is
defined as "the value of oil or gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code Ann. §§
59-5-102(l)(a), -101(19) (2000). The Tax Commission's decision was split with two of four commissioners agreeing with the Auditing Division that
valuation should occur at the point of sale, which it
equated with completed production. One commissioner agreed with ExxonMobil that valuation
should occur at the point of removal but gave that
interpretation prospective application only. The
fourth commissioner also agreed that ExxonMobil's
interpretation was correct, without the prospective
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application limitation. Thus, the Tax Commission
denied ExxonMobil's request for a refund. ExxonMobil requested reconsideration of the decision,
which was granted.
lj 8 Upon reconsideration by the Tax Commission,
two commissioners remained convinced of the correctness of the Auditing Division's position, while
the other two commissioners remained convinced
of the correctness of ExxonMobil's position. As to
the prospective application of the rule, two commissioners now agreed that ExxonMobil should be
entitled to relief. The Tax Commission*709 held,
based on the tie vote between the four commissioners, that the Auditing Division prevailed and value
would be measured at the point of sale for puiposes
of determining whether ExxonMobil was entitled to
the requested refund. Because ExxonMobil's refund
request depended upon valuation at the point of removal, summary judgment was entered against ExxonMobil. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section
78-2-2 (2002), ExxonMobil petitioned this court for
review of the Tax Commission's decision.
11 9 On appeal, ExxonMobil argues that the Tax
Commission erred by concluding that ExxonMobil
was not the prevailing party. ExxonMobil contends
that allowing the use of the Auditing Division's interpretation of the method for calculating the severance tax allows the Commission to impose a tax
despite the statutory mandate that the Tax Commission act only with a quorum of three agreeing. Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-205 (2000). Further, ExxonMobil
argues that the Commission erred by declaring the
Auditing Division the prevailing party despite the
tie vote because there is a statutory presumption
against taxation that cannot be overcome without a
majority vote. Lastly, ExxonMobil argues that the
Tax Commission's interpretation of the statutory
language in question was in error. Because we resolve this matter by statutory interpretation, we
need not consider ExxonMobil's arguments regarding the failure of three members of the Tax Commission to agree on an interpretation.
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ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] U 10 As questions of law, we review the Tax
Commission's interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this matter for correctness, according the Tax Commission's interpretations no deference. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah Slate
Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112. If 14. 61 P.3d 1053.
II. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
H 11 Two particular statutes require our review.
Both address valuation, providing:
Each person owning an interest ... in oil or gas produced from a well in the state, or in the proceeds
of the production, shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of
the oil or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field where the substance was
produced.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(1 )(a) (2000). " 'Value
at the well' means the value of oil or gas at the
point production is completed." A/.§ 59-5-101(19).
These two provisions form the crux of the dispute
now before us.
K 12 ExxonMobil contends that the severance tax is
to be calculated based on the value of the oil or gas
at the point at which it is removed from the earth. It
argues that although the value of its interest at the
well is further defined as the point of completed
production, the terms "production" and "extraction"
are used synonymously and render extraction as the
appropriate measure. Id.§ 59-5-101(20). Read in
light of section 59-5-103, which establishes methods of valuation, including the net-back method in
which the costs of post-extraction transportation
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and processing are deducted from the ultimate purchase price, id.§ 59-5-101(7), ExxonMobil argues
that its interpretation is compelled by the severance
tax statutes.
K 13 The Tax Commission counters that the statutory requirement that production be completed prior to valuation of the oil or gas necessarily implies
some post-extraction alteration. Also citing the
valuation section, 59-5-103, the Tax Commission
argues that the clear statutory preference for valuation by reference to an arm's-length contract supports its view that measuring the value of the oil
and gas at the point at which it is removed from the
earth is inappropriate given the dearth of sales that
occur at the immediate point of removal. Rather,
the Tax Commission suggests that, in the simplest
of situations, sales occur after at least some of the
BS & W is removed from the emulsion by storage
in the separator tank. Thus, the argument goes, the
clear preference for valuing the oil or gas by utilizing an arm's-length contract price would be illserved by a statutory scheme set up to determine
value at a *710 point where such arm's-length sales
rarely occur.
[2][3"][4] K 14 When we interpret a statute, we look
first to the plain language. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d
853. 866 (Utah 1996). In doing so, we give all statutory provisions relevance and meaning independent of other provisions. Id. If we find ambiguity in
the statute's language, we look to legislative history
and other policy considerations for guidance. Id. In
the context of a taxation statute, our evaluation of
ambiguous language also requires us to " 'construe
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer,
leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be
more restrictive if such intent exists.' " County Bd.
of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997)
(quoting Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n,
779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)). The statutory
language in question in this case is not plain and we
must resort to policy considerations and our man-
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date that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the
taxpayer.fM Id.
FNL We are not aware of, and the parties
have not cited, any relevant legislative history that would inform our interpretation
of the statutory provisions in question.
K 15 Although both ExxonMobil and the Tax Commission make reasonable arguments supporting
their respective interpretations of the point of valuation of oil and gas for severance tax purposes,
neither party's position completely reconciles with
the valuation provisions of the severance tax statutes. Section 59-5-103 establishes the methods for
computing the value of oil or gas for severance tax
purposes. It provides that the value is to be
"established under an arm's-length contract for the
purchase of production at the well." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-5-103(1) (2000). In the absence of an
arm's-length contract, section 59-5-103 provides
that other methods may be employed in descending
order to determine value. First, value may be ascertained by reference to a non-arm's-length contract if
it "is equivalent to the value received under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field." Id.
§ 59-5-103(l)(a). The next method of valuation allowable under section 59-5-103 allows one to determine value "by consideration of information relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in
the same field or nearby fields or areas such as:
posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot
sales, or other reliable public sources of price or
market information." Id. § 59-5-103(l)(b). The final method, allowed if no other method is applicable, is the net-back method, which allows a producer to determine the value of the oil or gas by deducting costs of transporting and processing from
the eventual sales or market price, up to 50% of the
value of the oil or gas. Id. §§ 59-5-103(l)(c), 101(7). The legislature's preferences for valuing oil
and gas are clear from this statute. Our interpretation of the statutory language in sections 59-5-101
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and -102 must give meaning and relevance to each
of the valuation methods. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d
at 866.
K 16 The Tax Commission reasonably concludes
that "production" supposes an alteration of the oil
or gas from its natural state. However, were we to
accept the Tax Commission's position, the net-back
valuation method would have no relevance-a result
we do not favor. Id. The Tax Commission's position
could never result in utilization of the net-back
method because any sale would necessarily be at
the point of completed production, where the Tax
Commission argues that valuation must occur.
Thus, the transportation and refinement costs deducted under the net-back method would never be
deductible from a sale price, but would merely represent added value taxed as part of the increased
purchase price. Additionally, the statutory definition of "well" notes that a well is an "extractive
means." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (2000).
This seems to indicate physical extraction from the
earth, not the extraction of oil or gas from other impurities further down the line as the Tax Commission suggests.
K 17 ExxonMobil's interpretation would require us
to slight the statute, albeit to a lesser degree. Its position is roughly that oil or gas should be valued at
the point of removal from the earth. This argument
ignores the clear legislative preference for
valuation*711 by reference to actual contracts for
sale, id.§ 59-5-103(1), because, according to the
Tax Commission's unchallenged factual findings,
sales rarely occur without at least some separation
in a separator tank or some further refinement.
U 18 Both parties support their interpretations by
offering various definitions of "production" from
different dictionaries, cases from other courts, and
unrelated statutes. Neither the Tax Commission's
position nor ExxonMobil's position is compelled by
the language of the statute. Likewise, there is no indication that the legislature intended its use of the

1
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word "production" in section 59-5-101(19) to be
given any of the definitions suggested by the parties.
T[ 19 Given the ambiguity in the statute, we are
compelled to consider the general principle that we
"construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the
taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an
intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists."
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944
P.2d at 373-74 (internal quotations omitted). Applying this standard, we hold that valuation does
not necessarily occur at the point of sale, wherever
that may be, but rather m the immediate vicinity of
the point at which the oil or gas is physically removed from the earth. However, to qualify as the
point at which production is complete, that point
must be one at which sales of the oil and gas may
actually occur.
T| 20 "At the well," where "production is complete,"
read in light of the language favoring valuation by
reference to an arm's-length contract price but allowing other methods, including the net-back method, contemplates valuation in the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the earth. The Tax
Commission's position regarding the statutory
meaning is incorrect because it relies heavily on
one interpretation of the phrase "production is completed" instead of harmonizing the various definitions at play in the severance tax statute. Accepting
the Tax Commission's position would lead to a
widely disparate tax, based not on the value of oil
or gas actually removed from the ground and thus
taken from the state's pool of natural resources, but
based on the sales and marketing strategies of the
various interest holders. A producer with testing facilities on site could sell directly from the well's
valve structure and pay a much smaller tax than one
who removes impurities or otherwise refines the oil
to sell at the battery facility. The language of the
statute contemplates calculation within the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the earth,
but it also compels calculation at some point where
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sales are not a distinct rarity.
T| 21 The nature of the industry is such that sales
rarely, if ever, occur directly from the valve structure, which appears to be the point of valuation advocated by ExxonMobil. The statute, however, assumes a market for oil and gas at the point of valuation. Thus, although we hold that valuation is to
occur in the immediate vicinity of the point of removal, it need not necessarily occur at the point of
physical removal from the earth. There appears to
be a market for oil and gas taken from the separator
tanks near the well head. The Tax Commission so
found, although it apparently believed the failure of
ExxonMobil to sell much of its oil and gas at that
point was fatal to its claim for valuation there. This
was error. Valuation of the oil and gas at the separator tank allows valuation to occur while the oil and
gas are in a relatively raw state, at the earliest possible, yet practicable, point of sale. Where no separator tank is used, valuation may still occur by reference to the value of similar oil at separator tanks in
the same field. This valuation system allows the use
of the preferences outlined in section 59-5-103, unlike the methods proposed by either of the parties.
% 22 The Tax Commission and amici believe an interpretation other than that adopted by the Tax
Commission would drain state revenues at a time
when revenue is relatively scarce. We are not blind
to the impact of our holding on the amount of taxes
collected and distributed to various governmental
entities, but any concerns we have with the reduction of revenue are not properly assuaged by an
ends-based statutory interpretation. If the legislature established the severance tax scheme to realize a specific revenue target and our interpretation
of its statutory language does not provide that
level*712 of revenue, the legislature may amend
the relevant statutes to provide for a different calculation of the tax that will achieve the desired revenue.
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III. APPLICATION OF OUR DECISION
[5] H 23 The revenue concerns cited by the Tax
Commission and amici convince us that application
of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in
this case. When invalidating the actions of a taxing
authority, we have long recognized that our decisions may be given prospective effect to protect
the solvency of governmental entities and to avoid
administrative and financial hardship caused by retroactive application of rules contrary to those relied
on by the taxing authorities. See, e.g., Rio Algom
Corp v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184. 196 (Utah
1984). We recognize, however, that preventing the
retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil,
which has expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits
of victory and "potentially] ... discourag[e] other
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable
validity." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
942 P.2d 906, 914 (Utah 1996) (citing Rio Algom,
681 P.2d at \96),vacated on other grounds,942
P.2d 915 (Utah 1997). We give our holding this selectively prospective application because we are
convinced that retroactive application could result
in large refunds of taxes already collected and spent
by governmental entities. Although the full breadth
and depth of the impact is not immediately apparent
from the record before us, no doubt it would be
substantial and involve funds already budgeted, collected, and spent. Large refunds of money already
collected and spent would pose a great burden on
the amici revitalization funds and other relatively
small governmental entities operating on correspondingly small budgets. Thus, whether in refund
requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only.

CONCLUSION
1) 24 We reverse the Tax Commission's determina-
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tion that severance taxes should be based on the
value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale.
Valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of
the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state. Although ExxonMobil is entitled
to further adjudication of its claim for a refund, as
to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply
prospectively only. Reversed.
H 25 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief
Justice DURRANI", Justice PARRJSH, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion.
Utah,2003.
ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n
86 P.3d 706, 159 Oil & Gas Rep. 421, 487 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6, 2003 UT 53
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